State v. Russo Appellant\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 38404 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-13-2013
State v. Russo Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 38404
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Russo Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 38404" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4406.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4406
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL ROWE RUSSO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 











CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2009-29933 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case raises a critical question concerning the Fourth Amendment's 
preference for search warrants, and its requirement that such warrants "particularly 
describ[e] the place to be searched: Can a reviewing court expand the scope of a 
search warrant (as described in that warrant's clear language), under the guise of giving 
it a "commonsense" interpretation. 
Michael Russo stands convicted of rape and two related felonies, and is currently 
serving a fixed life sentence. On appeal, Mr. Russo has asserted two claims of error. 
First, he has argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video 
discovered through a search of a cell phone found on his. person. Second, he has 
1 
contended that the district court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly 
prejudicial evidence concerning his deviant sexual interests. 
Mr. Russo's appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed his convictions. See generally State v. Russo, 2013 Opinion No. 15 (Mar. 4, 
2013) (hereinafter Opinion). With regard to the Fourth Amendment "search" issue, the 
Court of Appeals held that, even though officers had a warrant particularly describing 
the places to be searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his motorcycle, the police were 
nonetheless free to search-pursuant to the warrant-Mr. Russo's person and a phone 
found on his person, where Mr. Russo was detained outside the residence (and not on 
his motorcycle). (See Opinion, pp.3-6.) With regard to the issue concerning admission 
of the pornography evidence, the Court of Appeals found no error under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404. (See Opinion, pp.7-10.) 
Mr. Russo seeks Idaho Supreme Court review in this case. Although he seeks 
Idaho Supreme Court review of all issues, he contends that the most compelling reason 
for review to be granted can be found in the Court of Appeals' handling of the Fourth 
Amendment issue. Specifically, he contends that the Court of Appeals' Opinion on this 
issue is in conflict with United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho 
Court of Appeals precedent, as well as the plain language of the Fourth Amendment 
itself, insofar as it holds that a reviewing court may expand the scope of a search 
warrant beyond its plain language under the guise of giving that warrant a 
"commonsense" interpretation. Mr. Russo contends that this' holding is plainly incorrect 
and, if allowed to stand, would undermine not only the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, but also the preference for warrants generally. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the pre-dawn hours of August 27, 2009, J.W. was raped at knifepoint by a 
masked man in her Nampa apartment. (See 8/2/10 Tr., p.200, L.18 - p.220, L.15.)1 
When her assailant left, J.W. quickly called 9-1-1 to report the crime. (8/2/10 Tr., p.191, 
L.17 - p.193, L.2 (testimony of police dispatcher), p.220, L.16 - p.221, L.2, p.22, Ls.2-4 
(testimony of J.W.); Ex. 1 (recording of 9-1-1 call).) 
The investigating officers who responded to J.W.'s report immediately decided 
that Michael Russo would be their suspect.2 (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.289, Ls.18-22.) They 
quickly set up surveillance at his Meridian residence (8/3/10 Tr., p.289, L.24 - p.290, 
L.9, p.294, L.6 - p.296, L.21, p.350, L.7 - p.352, L.23) and, before too long, went about 
securing a search warrant for that residence (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.380, L.19 - p.381, L.18.) 
That warrant, authorizing searches of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle, was 
eventually issued by an Ada County magistrate. (See R., pp.133-34; 8/3/10 Tr., p.381, 
Ls.15-17.) 
While officers had Mr. Russo's residence under surveillance (and before the 
search warrant had arrived), they observed Mr. Russo leave his residence three times-
once to go behind his apartment building, and twice to check his mailbox. (R., p.142.) 
The third time Mr. Russo left his apartment, which was some time shortly before noon, 
1 There are a large number of separately-bound transcripts in the record on appeal in 
this case. Accordingly, transcripts are identified herein based on the date of the hearing 
in question. 
2 Mr. Russo was convicted of rape in Washington in 1995. (R., p.129.) Based largely 
on this fact, he would contend, once he moved to Idaho, he became the "usual suspect" 
for any rape or seemingly related crime in the Meridian/Nampa area. (See R., pp.125-
31 (police affidavit outlining the various crimes that Mr. Russo was accused of 
committing prior to this case coming about).) Notably, prior to this case coming about, 
Mr. Russo had not been charged with any of the Idaho crimes for which he had been 
accused. 
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at least two detectives seized, and then searched, him as part of what they referred to 
as "an investigatory detention.,,3 (R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, Ls.19-23, p.70, 
Ls.13-14, 17-18.) Although they had not observed Mr. Russo do anything illegal, 
possess a weapon, or act in a threatening manner, the detectives immediately 
handcuffed him; searched him, supposedly for weapons; removed his wallet from one of 
his back pockets and his cell phone from one of his front pockets4; and then placed 
Mr. Russo in a patrol car. (R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.70, L.19.) 
Approximately five minutes later, when another detective (Detective King) arrived, 
Mr. Russo's cell phone was handed over to that detective. (R., p.142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, 
Ls.21-25.) Thereafter, Det. King opened the phone and viewed its contents, supposedly 
"to determine ownership" of the phone,5 whereupon he discovered a video believed to 
have been taken of the rape of J.W.6 (R., p.154; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.23 - p.71, L.2.) At 
some point after that, based (at least in part) on the video found on his cell phone, 
Mr. Russo was arrested. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.75, Ls.11-25, p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.6.) Also 
based (at least in part) on the video found on the cell phone, the police obtained an 
3 When Mr. Russo asked if he was being arrested, one of the officers told him he was 
not; Detective Cain "told him it was called an investigatory detention." (R., p.142.) 
4 Although the evidence before the district court at the time that Mr. Russo's 
suppression motion was evaluated did not indicate whether Det. Cain knew that 
Mr. Russo's wallet and cell phone were not weapons when he removed them from 
Mr. Russo's pockets (see R., p.142), Det. Cain later testified at trial that he did know 
what they were before he removed them from Mr. Russo's pockets. (See 8/3/10 
Tr., p.356, Ls.1-4.) 
5 At the time that it evaluated Mr. Russo's suppression motion, the evidence before the 
district court-a sworn affidavit in support of an amended search warrant-indicated 
that Det. King searched the phone's contents "to determine ownership." (R., p.154.) At 
trial, however, Det. King testified that he searched Mr. Russo's phone "to see if there 
was [sic] and photos or videos on there." (8/3/10 Tr., p.492, Ls.15-19.) 
6 The 8-second video clip depicts a close-up view of a male and a female engaged in 
vaginal intercourse. Because of the close-up view, no faces are visible and the 
identities of the participants, therefore, are not readily apparent. (See Ex. 49.) 
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amended warrant authorizing a search of that phone. (See R, pp.153-54 (relevant 
portion of affidavit in support of amended warrant), 155-57 (amended warrant).) 
On September 3, 2009, a grand jury indicted Mr. Russo on one count of rape, 
one count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. (R, pp.10-12.) 
On January 7, 2010, while he was awaiting trial, Mr. Russo filed, pursuant to the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article 
I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, a motion to suppress, inter alia, the evidence 
discovered on his cell phone? (R., pp.73-75.) Mr. Russo argued that neither his 
detention and search, nor the search of his phone, was undertaken pursuant to a 
warrant, and that they exceeded anything that might be permissible pursuant to the 
Terf"'/ exception to the warrant requirement. (See R., pp.73-75.) 
In response, the State filed a memorandum in opposition (see R, pp.100-05, 
111-22), and provided a documentary record by which the district court could discern 
7 Mr. Russo sought suppression of certain evidence on two other grounds (see 
R, pp.73-80 (suppression motion challenging not only the search of the phone, but also 
the issuance of the search warrants and procurement of certain statements made after 
invocation of the right to silence/counsel)); however, because those suppression 
arguments are not related to any issue raised on appeal, they are not discussed any 
further herein. 
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court, held as 
follows: 
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may 
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he 
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and 
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the 
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons which might be used to assault him. 
Id. at 30-31. 
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the relevant facts (see R., pp.123-59 (exhibits 1 through 6, consisting of the affidavit in 
support of the original search warrant, the original search warrant itself, a police report 
prepared by Det. Palfreyman (one of the detectives who detained and searched 
Mr. Russo), a police report prepared by Det. Cain (the other detective who detained and 
searched Mr. Russo), the affidavit in support of the amended search warrant, and the 
amended search warrant)9). The State argued that Mr. Russo was properly detained 
because police can always detain the occupants of a residence while a search warrant 
is being sought for that residence; however, the State made no attempt to argue that the 
search of Mr. Russo's person and, subsequently, his phone, could have been proper. 
(See R., pp.111-14.) The State then argued that, even if the phone was searched 
illegally, the fruits of the search were not subject to exclusion because of either the 
attenuation doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, or the independent source 
doctrine. (See R., pp.114-21.) 
A lengthy hearing, consisting solely of arguments of counsel, was held on 
Mr. Russo's suppression motion on January 27, 2010. (See generally 1/27/10 Tr.) At 
that hearing, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that Mr. Russo's phone could not be 
searched pursuant to the warrant authorizing a search of his home and motorcycle 
because the phone was located on Mr. Russo's person, and his person was outside 
when he was detained by the police. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.34: LS.18-25, p.51, Ls.16-20.) 
In response, the State appears to have augmented the argument presented in its 
briefing, this time asserting that the search of Mr. Russo's cell phone was permissible 
9 Later, at the suppression hearing, the district court also ag'reed to take judicial notice 
of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings in finding the relevant facts. (See 1/27/10 
Tr., p.20, Ls.6-25.) 
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because the original search warrant authorized a search for phones (implicitly 
authorizing a search of those phones, the State argued) and, even if the original search 
warrant did not authorize the search, the amended warrant specifically authorized a 
search of that phone. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.7-23.) The State also argued, as it had 
in its briefing, that regardless of the legality of the search of the phone, "inevitably, that 
cell phone would have been searched as Mr. Russo was being interviewed by Detective 
Weekes" (1/27/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6); however, the State never explained how it was that 
an "investigatory detention" would have inevitably resulted in a search of Mr. Russo's 
phone (see generally 1/27/10 Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.47, L.13).1O 
The district court ruled on Mr. Russo's suppression motion from the bench at the 
January 27, 2010 hearing. 11 (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.80, L.11 - p.83, L.23.) The district 
court concluded that Mr. Russo was properly detained, but it did not reach the issue of 
whether he (or his phone) was properly searched because the exclusionary rule would 
not apply since the video on the phone would have inevitably been discovered. 
(1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it was inevitable 
that the video would have been discovered because, even though the first search 
warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for phones 
10 In its briefing, the State had argued that, even if the original search of the phone was 
unconstitutional, because the police were specifically looking for a cell phone that might 
contain photos or video of J.W.'s rape, having found a phone on Mr. Russo's person the 
police inevitably would have sought a warrant authorizing a search of that phone. 
~R., p.119.) 
1 A few days later, the district court did enter a written order denying Mr. Russo's 
motion; however, that order did not expand upon or clarify the district court's oral ruling, 
as it simply incorporated the "factual findings and conclusions of the law" made on the 
record at the hearing. (See R., p.166.) 
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and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 -
p.83, L.23.) 
Also prior to trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive evidence of 
Mr. Russo's alleged "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b). (See, e.g., R., pp.44-46 (original notice of intent to offer evidence under I.R.E. 
404(b)), pp.47-51 (original motion in limine), pp.52-72 (memorandum in support of 
original motion in limine), pp.85-88 (reply memorandum in support of original motion in 
limine), pp.187 -227 (offer of proof in support of original motion in limine), p.237 (second 
motion in limine), pp.228-35 (memorandum in support of second motion in limine).) 
Among the evidence the State sought to have admitted under Rule 404(b) was 
evidence that: (1) during a police interrogation, Mr. Russo had admitted to Detective 
Weekes that he had sexual fantasies involving rape; and (2) certain pornographic 
images depicting simulated rape were found in Mr. Russo's vehicle. After extensive 
proceedings on the State's proffered Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court ultimately 
found the rape fantasy evidence, and some of the rape pornography evidence, to be 
admissible. (See 3/18/10 Tr., p.67, L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77; L.25 - p.78, L.7 (fantasy 
evidence), p.67, L.14 - p.68, L.10, p.78, Ls.7-10 (pornography evidence); 4/22/10 Tr., 
p.9, LS.6-11 (fantasy evidence); 5/11/10 Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.28, L.2, p.29, L.23 - p.31, 
L.23 (pornography evidence); R., pp.175-76 (both fantasy and pornography evidence), 
p.243 (pornography evidence). 
Mr. Russo's case went to trial in August of 2010. (See generally 8/2/10 
Tr.; 8/3/10 Tr.; 8/4/10 Tr.; 8/5/10 Tr.) At trial, the cell phone video was admitted in two 
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different forms. 12 First, Exhibit 47, a video made by the Idaho State Police as officers 
went through the contents of the cell phone, including the video in question, was 
admitted. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.494, L.2 - p.497, L.15; Ex. 47.) Next, Exhibit 49, an 
"enhanced" version of the video, complete with still captures of certain frames, was 
admitted. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.502, L.3 - p.511, L.11; Ex. 49.) In addition, there was 
substantial argument and testimony regarding the video. (See, e.g., 8/2/10 Tr., p.185, 
LS.14-20 (prosecutor's opening statement referencing the video and asserting that it 
"shows the defendant raping [J.W.]"); 8/2/10 Tr., p.226, Ls.1-19 (J.W.'s testimony that 
Det. King showed her a video, and that she identified herself in that video because "I 
know my vagina, and I know just how I am. I just knew it was me"); 8/3/10 Tr., p.492, 
LS.20-25 (Det. King describing the contents of the video); 8/3/10 Tr., p.511, L.21 -
p.512, L.5 (Det. King identifying certain characteristics of the female in the video); 
8/4/10 Tr., p.91, L.17 - p.94, L.10 (Dr. Lisa Minge discussing the physiology of the 
female in the video, comparing it to that of J.W., and offering her expert opinion that 
J.W. is the female in the video); 8/4/10 Tr., p.155, Ls.15-24, p.159, LS.9-20 
(prosecutor's closing argument reminding the jurors of the video and arguing that 
Mr. Russo and J.W. are the two individuals depicted therein).) 
Also admitted at Mr. Russo's trial was evidence and argument concerning 
Mr. Russo's rape fantasies and his alleged possession of pornography depicting 
12 All of the exhibits in this case which contain sexual content, i.e., Exhibits 4-6 (photos 
of the victim's pubic area), Exhibit 47 (video of officers going through Mr. Russo's cell 
phone), Exhibit 49 ("enhanced" video from Mr. Russo's cell phone), Exhibit 51 
(pornography allegedly found in Mr. Russo's car), were originally retained by the district 
court. However, on March 20, 2012, Mr. Russo filed a motion to augment the record 
with these exhibits, and to have them transported to the Supreme Court (and held under 
seal). That motion was granted by this Court on April 16, 2012. 
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simulated rapes. With regard to the fantasies, the State offered the testimony of 
Del. Weekes, who detailed Mr. Russo's statements on this topic: 
Q. . . .. Did you and Mr. Russo have a conversation with regards 
to pornography? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. And can you briefly describe what you were talking about-or I'll 
back up. 
What type of pornography did he describe? 
A. He described watching pornography that depicted rape. 
Q. And did he tell you what happens when he watches this type of 
pornography? 
A. He did. He told me that it turns him on and it makes him want to 
have sex. 
Q. Did he, in your conversation, provide to you when he first started 
viewing this type of pornography? 
A. He did. Mr. Russo explained to me that he believed he was 
approximately 15 or 16 years old the first time he saw a video that 
depicted rape. And he described that portion of that video to me. 
Q. And what was his description? 
A. He told me that the video was a female that a male had taken 
out into the desert, and he had began raping this female. And in the 
video, during the rape, the female decided that she liked it and became 
happy and wanted to become a participant in it. And that's how he 
described that video taking place. 
Q. And did he go further and to say what type of fantasies were 
developed from watching this video? 
A. He talked-he talked to me about his fantasies that he had, yes. 
Q. And what were those fantasies, detective? . 
A. He told me he had abnormal violent sexual fantasies. 
Q. And can you briefly go into the conversation that you had with 
Mr. Russo and what he told you? 
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A. I was talking to him about his fantasies and explained to him-I 
told him that he didn't have fantasies like everybody else did. And he told 
me he had abnormal sexual fantasies. And I told him he had violent 
sexual fantasies. And initially, he told me he didn't. And I said, "Mike, 
rape is violent." And he said, "you're right. Rape is violent. I shouldn't 
deny that. I have violent abnormal sexual fantasies." But he minimized it 
by saying that but [sic] his fantasies-his words are he minimized that 
because at least in his fantasies, he wasn't hitting or punching someone. 
Q. And did he go further into any specifics of what type of fantasy, 
exactly, that he had? 
A. He did. He told me that he had a fantasy about raping a woman, 
and in the middle of it, she would decide she wanted it, and would 
basically become a willing participant in that. 
(8/4/10 Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.42, L.9.) 
With regard to the pornography, the State offered Exhibits 50 (a photo of 
Mr. Russo's Mazda 626) and 51 (printed pornographic images depicting simulated rape) 
through Detective King, who testified that the pornography was found in Mr. Russo's 
Mazda 626, along with registration and insurance paperwork for that vehicle showing 
Mr. Russo as the owner of that vehicle. 13 (See 8/3/10 Tr.,p.513, L.13 - p.517, L.11, 
p.549, L.10-18.) Further, although the jurors could certainly have evaluated Exhibit 51 
for themselves, Det. King nevertheless described the pornographic images depicted 
therein: 
A male holding a female down by the shoulders as she's nude. Another 
male penetrating her vagina with his penis. There's also another photo of 
the same female, her mouth being penetrated by the male. . .. Bride 
abuse is at the corner here, brideabuse.com. Well, I've seen this type of 
picture before, and I know what Bride Abuse is, so you can't see dot-com, 
but I believe it's brideabuse.com. 
13 Detective King also testified about rape pornography allegedly found in a Jeep 
Cherokee (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.517, L.22 - p.523, L.11, p.549, Ls.19-24); however, that 
testimony was later stricken based on the tenuousness of Mr. Russo's connection to 
that vehicle (see 8/4/10 Tr., p.96, L.22 - p.104, L.25, p.105, L.20 - p.1 06, L.6, p.109, 
Ls.9-25). 
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(8/3/10 Tr., p.516, Ls.16-25.) 
Finally, in its closing argument, the State referenced both the rape fantasies and 
the rape porn as follows: "[R]eturn to what Detective Weekes and her conversations 
with Mr. Russo about his sexual fantasies, how this makes him feel powerful, how it 
makes him feel in control, these rapes. He watches the pornography. It has the rape in 
it." (8/4/10 Tr., p.159, Ls.3-8.) 
Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. (8/5/10 Tr., p.5, L.18 -
p.6, L.8; R. pp.369-70.) Thereafter, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence 
of fixed life. (See 11/30/10 Tr., p.96, Ls.4-16; R, pp.413-14.) The district court then 
entered its judgment of conviction on December 1,2010. (R, pp.413-14.) 
On December 28,2010, Mr. Russo filed a notice of appeal. (R, pp.415-16.) On 
appeal before the Court of Appeals, he argued that the district court erred in failing to 
suppress the cell phone video, and in allowing the State to offer evidence and argument 
concerning his deviant sexual interests. 
On March 4, 2013, the Court of Appeal issued a published opinion affirming 
Mr. Russo's conviction. (See generally Opinion.) With regard to the Fourth Amendment 
"search" issue, the Court of Appeals held that, even though officers had a warrant 
particularly describing the places to be searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his 
motorcycle, the police were nonetheless free to search-pursuant to the warrant-
Mr. Russo's person and a phone found on his person, even though Mr. Russo was 
detained outside the residence (and not on his motorcycle). (See Opinion, pp.3-6.) 
With regard to the issue concerning admission of the pornography evidence, the Court 
of Appeals relied on State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009), and People v. 
12 
Pe/o, 942 N.E.2d 463 (III. Ct. App. 2010), to hold, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
that the pornographic material depicting simulated rape and the testimony concerning 
Mr. Russo's rape fantasies were "relevant to prove Russo's motive, intent, or plan," and 
were not so unfairly prejudicial that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
them. (See Opinion, pp.7-10.) 
Mr. Russo seeks Idaho Supreme Court review in this case. Although he seeks 
Idaho Supreme Court review of all issues, he contends that the most compelling reason 
for review to be granted can be found in the Court of Appeals' handling of the Fourth 
Amendment issue. Specifically, he contends that the Court of Appeals' Opinion on this 
issue is in conflict with United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho 
Court of Appeals precedent, as well as the plain language of the Fourth Amendment 
itself, insofar as it holds that a reviewing Court may expand the scope of a search 
warrant beyond its plain language under the guise of giving that warrant a 
"commonsense" interpretation. Mr. Russo contends that this holding is plainly incorrect 
and, if allowed to stand, would undermine not only the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, but also the preference for warrants generally. 
ISSUES 
1. Are there special and important reasons for review to be granted in this case? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an 
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone? 
3. Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 




There Are Special And Important Reasons For Review To Be Granted In This Case 
A. Introduction 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered 
though. Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be 
considered in evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.A.R. 118(b). 
Mr. Russo contends that there are special and important reasons for review to be 
granted in this case. Most importantly, the Court of Appeals' handling of the 
suppression issue in this case is in conflict with precedent from this Court, the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals itself, as well as the plain language of 
the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the Court of Appeals' handling of the Rule 404(b) 
issue is in conflict with precedent. 
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B. The Court Of Appeals' Handling Of The Suppression Issue Is In Conflict With 
Precedent. As Well As The Plain Language Of The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
(emphasis added). Based on this clear language, it would seem to be self-evident that, 
if the search of a place is to be justified under a given warrant, that place must have 
been "particularly describ[ed]" in that warrant. 
In this case, although the warrant at issue particularly described the places to be 
searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his motorcycle,14 the Court of Appeals 
nevertheless held that a search of Mr. Russo's person and the cell phone found on his 
person (even though Mr. Russo was seized while outside of his residence, and not on 
his motorcycle) was also justified under that warrant. (Opinion, pp.3-6.) The Court of 
14 The original warrant described the places to be searched as follows: 
Residence: 818 W. 8th Street, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. The 
residence sits at the dead end of Northwest 8th Street in Meridian and 
faces West. The residence is a four-plex with a brown shingle roof. The 
front of the residence has brick on it. The sides of the house are a pale 
white wood. The residence has the silver metal numbers 818 affixed to a 
brown piece of wood on the front of the residence to the left of the door. 
The residence has a white door. There is a stairwell on the south and 
east side of the four-plex. The residence of 818 is located on the bottom 
floor of the four-plex and is on the left side if you are facing the house from 
Northwest 8th Street. 
Motorcycle: a 1983 Black Harley Davidson Motorcycle. The license plate 
number is MRE345. The motorcycle is registered to Michael Russo. 
(R., p.134.) The warranted then concluded by commanding law enforcement "to make 
immediate search of the above-described premises .... " (R., p.134 (emphasis 
added).) 
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Appeals reasoned that Mr. Russo was properly detained and frisked for weapons 15 and, 
although "[t]he search still occurred outside the apartment described in the warrant and 
the individual was not identified as a person to be searched," because the search 
warrant identified a cell phone as an item to be searched for, "once the detectives 
identified the object in Russo's pocket as a cell phone during a lawful frisk, 2 
commonsense reading of the scope of the search warrant allowed them to retain the 
cell phone and search its contents." (Opinion, pp.5-6 (emphasis added)). Further, the 
Court of Appeals remarked that, even had the officers not had a basis to frisk Mr. Russo 
for weapons, "it is arguable that the police would have been justified to search Russo's 
person for the phone under the scope of the warrant .... " (Opinion, p.6 n.2.) Key to 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion in this regard, apparently, were: (a) its assumption 
that, had Mr. Russo been detained inside his residence, he undoubtedly would have 
been subject to search under the warrant; and (b) its distaste for the notion "that by 
stepping outside of his apartment, [Mr. Russo] crossed a threshold that somehow 
provided him with greater protection than would have been available if he were inside 
his residence." (Opinion, p.6 n.2.) 
Mr. Russo respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals' conclusion and 
analysis are flawed; he contends that they represent a misreading of the Fourth 
Amendment's particularity requirement and a dramatic diminution of the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant preference. As such, the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict 
15 Mr. Russo has conceded that he was properly detained pursuant to Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); however, he has argued that a frisk for weapons was 
not permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and, even if it were permissible, 
a search along the lines contemplated in Terry certainly could not have justified the 
officers' search of his cell phone. 
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with precedent from this Court, the United States Supreme Court, and the Court of 
Appeals itself. 
As noted above, the plain language of the Fourth Amendment clearly and 
unequivocally requires that, if a search of a place is to be justified under a certain 
warrant, that place must have been "particularly describ[ed]" in the warrant relied upon. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Indeed, the "particularly" language of the Fourth 
Amendment is specifically directed at the "place to searched ," suggesting that the place 
particularly described must be the place actually searched. Thus, Professor LaFave 
has explained that, "[a] search made under authority of a search warrant may extend to 
the entire area covered by the warrant's description." Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.10(a), at _ (5th ed. 2012). "The first 
inquiry, therefore, is whether the place searched reasonably appeared to be the place 
described." Id. § 4.10(a) at _ n.4. Under Professor LaFave's reasoning, if the place 
actually searched does not fall within the description of the place described in the 
warrant, the search cannot be upheld under that warrant. 
The scant case law on this subject supports this analysis. In United States v. 
Johnson, 640 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2011), for example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explicitly held that "[t]he authority to search granted by any warrant is limited to the 
specific places described in it and does not extend to additional or different places." Id. 
at 845 (quoting United States v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 739, 744 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
Likewise, in State v. Mathison, 263 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 1978), the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota held that "officers executing a search warrant are, and ought to be, strictly 
limited to searching only the premises particularly described in the warrant. It is 
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constitutionally impermissible to search one place under a warrant describing another 
place or to seize one item under a warrant naming another item." Id. at 63. 
Most importantly, perhaps, in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the argument advanced by the Court of 
Appeals in this case, and it rejected that argument out of hand, albeit in dicta. In 
Summers, officers arrived at a residence with a search warrant, intending to search the 
residence for illegal drugs. Id. at 693. When they arrived, they saw Summers, who 
turned out to be the owner of the residence, walk out the front door and down the front 
steps of the porch. Id. The police detained him while they searched the residence; 
later, after having found drugs in the search of the residence, they arrested Summers, 
searched his person, and found additional drugs in his coat pocket. Id. In reviewing 
Summers' suppression motion, the Supreme Court stated the following: 
The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial detention 
of respondent violated his constitutional right to be. secure against an 
unreasonable seizure of his person. The State attempts to justify the 
eventual search of respondent's person by arguing that the authority to 
search premises granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to 
search persons on those premises, just as that authority included an 
authorization to search furniture and containers in which the particular 
things described might be concealed. But as the Michigan Court of 
Appeals correctly noted. even if otherwise acceptable. this argument could 
not justify the initial detention of respondent outside the premises 
described in the warrant. See [People v. Summers,] 68 Mich. App., at 
578-580, 243 N.W.2d, at 692-693-C 6] 
16 The Michigan Court of Appeals' analysis of this issue. seemingly endorsed by the 
United States Supreme Court, was as follows: 
The prosecutor argues in the alternative that. the courts of other 
states have allowed the search of individuals found on the premises to 
prevent the complete frustration of the warrant. Otherwise, it is claimed, 
occupants would simply conceal contraband upon their person as the 
police announce their presence. Applying the test found in those cases, 
the prosecutor states that there was "reasonable cause" for the police to 
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Summers, 452 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court was clearly of 
the view that, where officers have a valid warrant authorizing the search of a residence, 
they are not free to search beyond the place particularly described in the warrant by 
searching someone found outside the residence, even though that person is the owner 
of the residence for which the warrant was issue, and even though the evidence sought 
is of such a nature that it is just as likely to be on the person of the individual searched 
as it is to be inside the residence. 
Accordingly, where, as here, the search warrant unambiguously describes the 
discreet places to be searched, the police are not free to expand the scope of their 
search beyond the places particularly described in the warrant based solely on their 
belief that the evidence they seek is located nearby-even if their belief is reasonable.17 
believe defendant had upon his person property subject to the warrant. 
Particular accent is put on defendant's presence on the scene and his 
ownership of the house. 
Our courts have never explored the extent to which persons found 
upon the premises as a search warrant is executed can be searched 
without another warrant. This is not the occasion to decide that issue, for 
all of the cited cases require at the very least presence upon the premises 
being searched. That factor cannot be found here. The defendant was 
stopped outside of the house. There hardly could be any items on his 
person which were subject to the search warrant, since the items too were 
outside the designated premises. Taking defendant back inside did not 
change the situation. Even if the police acted legally in doing so, an issue 
we do not decide here, failure to search defendant's person certainly 
would not "frustrate" the execution of the warrant. There could be little fear 
that items in the house would be taken and concealed by defendant, who 
was being detained and watched by Officer Conant. 
People v. Summers, 243 N.W.2d 689, 692-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). 
17 When it comes to searches undertaken pursuant to warrants (or later sought to be 
justified as having been undertaken to warrants), police officers in the field do not get to 
decide whether probable cause exists; that is a decision for a neutral and detached 
magistrate. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
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In this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that because Mr. Russo 
was close to his residence, and perhaps his motorcycle, and because it was reasonable 
for the officers to believe that the evidence they sought could be found on his person, 
the scope of the warrant could be expanded to Mr. Russo's person and the items found 
thereon. (See Opinion, p.6 & n.2.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals relied on two of its 
prior cases where it had held that "[i]n general, courts should avoid hypertechnicality 
when interpreting warrants" and that "[w]arrants should be viewed in a commonsense 
and realistic fashion." (Opinion, p.6 (citing State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho 153, 155 (Ct. App. 
1986), and State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 388 (Ct. App. 1985), respectively)). But the 
authorities relied upon are inapposite. In both Sapp and Holman, the relevant question 
was whether the search warrants at issue were sufficiently specific in identifying the 
places to be searched in order for the warrants to be valid on their faces. Sapp, 110 
Idaho at 154-56; Holman, 109 Idaho at 388. In both cases, the Court of Appeals 
recognized that a search warrant need not contain a technical legal description of the 
place to be searched; in both cases, it held that as long as the warrant contains a 
description sufficient for the place to be searched to be located and distinguished from 
The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men 
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a 
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will 
justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the 
discretion of police officers .... When the right of privacy must reasonably 
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, 
not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, (1948) (footnotes omitted). 
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surrounding areas, the warrant is valid on its face. Sapp, 110 Idaho at 155-56; Holman, 
109 Idaho 3SS. Likewise, in United States v. Ventrasca, 3S0 U.S. 102 (1965), the key 
case relied upon by the Court of Appeals in both Sapp and Holman, the United States 
Supreme Court was discussing the validity of search warrants when it commented on 
how the warrant process should be "commonsense and realistic." Ventrasca, 3S0 U.S. 
at 10S. Further, when the Court made this comment, it was discussing affidavits 
submitted in support of search warrants, not search warrants themselves. 18 Id. Thus, 
the fact is that neither Sapp, nor Holman, nor Ventrasca supports the proposition that a 
valid search warrant, particularly describing the places to be searched, may be 
expanded to include places not described therein, simply because common sense 
dictates that the evidence sought may be found in those other places. 19 
Furthermore, Mr. Russo submits that, to the extent that the place(s) named in a 
search warrant are subjective to interpretation by a reviewing court, they should not be 
18 The relevant passage from Ventrasca is as follows: 
These decisions reflect the recognition that the Fourth Amendment's 
commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not 
abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the 
constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one 
involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in 
a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by 
nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical 
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law 
pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative 
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police 
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. 
Ventrasca, 3S0 U.S. at 10S. 
19 The reality is that if common sense dictates that the evidence sought could likely have 
been found on Mr. Russo's person, the State could simply have sought a warrant 
authorizing a search of his residence, his motorcycle, and his person. Recognizing this 
reality, the Court of Appeals took the opportunity to "suggest that, in the future, "a 
search warrant specifically include the person in instances where the warrant identifies 
a particular premises and items typically found on a person known to reside there." 
(Opinion, p.6 (emphasis in original).) 
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interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with their plain language. Cf. Verska v. 
Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011) (holding that statutes 
which are clear on their face are not subjected to judicial interpretation; rather, the clear 
language itself is controlling). And, in this case, the scope of the search warrant was 
exceptionally clear; it covered Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle, and nothing more. 
(See note 14, supra.) Thus, it left no room for "interpretation," i.e., expansion by the 
Court of Appeals. 
Because the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case represents a retrospective re-
writing (and expansion) of the scope of the relevant search warrant, it flies in the face of 
the Fourth Amendment itself, as well as precedent interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 
Accordingly, there are special and important reasons for review to be granted in this 
case. 
C. The Court Of Appeals' Handling Of The Rule 404(b) Evidence Is In Conflict With 
Precedent 
Although the Court of Appeals' handling of the suppression issue is the most 
glaring error in the Court of Appeals' Opinion, Mr. Russo contends that the Opinion is 
also in conflict with precedent in its handling of the evidence of Mr. Russo's deviant 
sexual interests under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404. 
The Court of Appeals held that evidence of Mr. Russo's sexual fantasies 
involving rape, and his possession of pornographic images depicting simulated rape, 
"was relevant to prove Russo's motive, intent, or plan." (Opinion, p.9.) This holding 
was based on its prior decision in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding that incest stories were relevant to show the defendant's intent in molesting his 
daughter), rev. denied, and the Illinois Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Pelo, 942 
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N.E. 2d 463 (III. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that rape fantasy pornography was relevant in a 
rape case because that pornography "involved acts and scenarios that were emulated 
by the perpetrator"). (Opinion, pp.8-9.) Apparently, the Court of Appeals reasoned that 
because Mr. Russo is sexually aroused by rape scenarios (real or simulated), that fact 
somehow proves his motive, intent, or plan to rape J.W. in this case. (See Opinion, 
pp.7-10.) 
The flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis is that it relies on a general trait of the 
defendant (his sexual fascination with rape), as evidenced by his prior misdeeds 
(possession of not only pornography, but of particularly offensive pornography, as well 
as his deviant sexual fantasies) for the assumption that he acted in conformity therewith 
(in raping J.W.). In other words, the Court of Appeals' Opinion reasons that, if 
Mr. Russo is the kind of man who would fantasize about rape, he must be the kind of 
man who would want to, or would plan to, commit an actual rape. But this is precisely 
the logical misstep that was cautioned against in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2008), 
where this Court held that "Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its 
tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Id. at 
54; accord State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010); State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 
459,462-63 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The fact is that, in this case, there is no objective link, other than propensity, 
between Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interest in rape, and the rape of J.W. See 
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668 ("The events must be linked by common characteristics that 
go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to 
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establish that the same person committed the acts."). Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that evidence of Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests was relevant 
to show his motive, intent, or plan to rape J.W. is in conflict with precedent from this 
Court, as well as the Court of Appeals itself. This is another reason why review should 
be granted in this case. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An 
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone 
A. Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following 
guarantee: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend IV.20 This text embodies a Constitutional preference that 
governmental searches and seizures be undertaken pursuant to warrants. Thus, it has 
been held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). "The burden of proof rests with the State to 
demonstrate that [a given warrantless] search either fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
20 The Idaho Constitution provides a guarantee that is virtually identical to that of the 
Fourth Amendment. See IDAHO CONST. Article I § 17. 
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circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). Traditionally, it has been 
held that if the State fails to meet its burden in this regard, and the search in question is 
determined to be unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule precludes the State from using 
its ill-gotten evidence against the defendant at trial. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 
915 (Ct. App. 2006); see a/so Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (referring to the 
exclusionary rule as "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments"). 
In this case, the district court did not reach the issue of whether Mr. Russo or his 
phone were improperly searched; instead, it ruled that even if the searches were 
undertaken in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would not apply 
since the video found on the phone would have inevitably been discovered by the police 
anyway. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it was 
inevitable that the video would have been discovered because, even though the first 
search warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for 
phones and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, 
L.22 - p.83, L.23.) 
Mr. Russo submits that the district court's ruling was in error. Below, he explains 
why the searches of his person and his phone violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Thereafter, he explains why the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule 
does not apply and why the proper remedy for the Fourth Amendment violations, 
therefore, was exclusion of the ill-gotten evidence. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate court 
must accept those of the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by 
substantial evidence, but it can freely review the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video 
As noted, Mr. Russo contends that the officers' search of his person, then his cell 
phone, was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. This is so for three reasons: 
first, although a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of his residence and 
motorcycle, that warrant did not extend to a search of his person where he was 
detained outside of his residence; second, the Terry exception to the warrant 
requirement cannot justify a search of Mr. Russo's person under the facts of this case 
and, even if it could, the search of Mr. Russo's phone was not a valid Terry search; 
third, because Mr. Russo was not arrested until after his phone was searched (and his 
arrest was based, at least in part, on what was discovered on his phone), the search of 
his person and his phone cannot be justified under the "search incident to arrest" 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
Mr. Russo further contends that, because discovery of the cell phone video was 
not inevitable under the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies such that the 
district court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of the officers' unconstitutional search 
of his phone. 
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1. Even If Mr. Russo Was Properly Detained While Officers Obtained And 
Executed A Search Warrant For His Residence, He Could Not Be 
Searched Pursuant To That Warrant 
Michigan v. Summers involved facts analogous, in many respects, to those in this 
case. In Summers, police were preparing to execute a search warrant on a residence 
when they encountered the owner of the house heading down his front steps; the 
officers detained him and, eventually, searched him (finding contraband on his person). 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. The question in that case was whether the Fourth 
Amendment permits officers to temporarily detain the occupant of a residence while 
they search the house pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate. State v. Summers, 
452 U.S. at 702-703. The Supreme Court held that it does. Id. at 705. 
In light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Summers, therefore, 
there is little doubt that the police in this case were acting within the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment when they detained Mr. Russo outside his home as they obtained 
and executed a search warrant for his home. See id.; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 
U.S. 326, 331-34 (2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the detention of the 
occupant outside of his home (in what was less than a full arrest) while a search warrant 
was being obtained). 
However, just because Mr. Russo could be detained to: (1) "prevent[ ] flight in 
the event that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimize[d] the risk of harm to the 
officers"; and (3) facilitate "the orderly completion of the search," i.e., provide access to 
the police so that they did not destroy his residence, Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, that 
does not mean that he could also be searched. In fact, the Summers Court spoke to 
this very issue and made it clear that because the occupant was found outside the place 
or thing to be searched pursuant to the warrant, i.e., the residence, the warrant itself did 
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not allow for a search of his person while he was being detained. Id. at 694. The Court 
stated as follows: 
The State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's person 
by arguing that the authority to search premises granted by the warrant 
implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises, just 
as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and 
containers in which the particular things described might be concealed. 
But ... even if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify the 
initial detention of respondent outside the premises described in the 
warrant. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Because a search warrant does not extend beyond the place or thing to be 
searched, see id., and because the original search warrant in this case authorized only 
the searches of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle (R., p.134), the search of 
Mr. Russo's person (and, by extension, the phone found on his person), while he was 
outside his residence, was clearly not conducted in accordance with the warrant.21 
Thus, that search is presumptively unconstitutional and it is the State's burden to 
demonstrate that a well recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. 
2. Even If Mr. Russo Was Validly Detained, Under The Standards Set Forth 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), There Was No Basis To Search Him 
For Weapons And, Even If There Was, The Officers' Search Of 
Mr. Russo's Phone Far Exceeded What Was Permissible Under Terry 
When police officers detain occupants of residences being searched pursuant to 
magistrate-issued warrants, they need not do so at undue personal risk. Thus, in 
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), the Supreme Court held that it was 
constitutionally permissible for officers to handcuff and detain occupants of the 
21 For further discussion of the scope of the search warrant, and the reasons why it 
cannot be used to justify the relevant search in this case, see Part I(B), supra, which is 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
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residence being searched because, under the facts of that case, the execution of the 
warrant was "inherently dangerous.,,22 Id. at 99-100. 
Likewise, many courts have held that it is constitutionally permissible for officers 
to frisk the detained occupants of the residence being searched where the officers have 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the detainees are armed and dangerous. For 
example, in Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that, under "the totality of the circumstances" (which included the 
facts that officers were searching for both guns and drugs, it was dark, the officers were 
badly outnumbered by the "partying" occupants, and the defendant was wearing a coat 
under which a weapon could be concealed), the officers had a "reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that appellant might be armed and dangerous," such that they "acted lawfully 
in performing a pat-down frisk of appellant for weapons." Id. at 1228-30. The Germany 
Court was very clear, however, in explaining that the "pat-down frisk" approved of was 
no more intrusive than the limited search authorized in Terry, see id. at 1222 n.7, and 
that, by approving of the pat-down frisk in that case, it most certainly was "not hold[ing] 
that, in every case, police may frisk all occupants of a residence being searched 
pursuant to a warrant" because, "[a]s Professor LaFave aptly puts it, 'it remains clear 
that there is no authority justifying the police to "routinely" frisk those present at any 
search warrant execution.'" Id. at 1230 n.19 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.9(d) (4th ed. Supp. 2009-10)). 
Apparently, most jurisdictions are in accord with the D.C. Circuit on this issue. 
See Germany, 984 A.2d at 1230 n.19 (compiling cases wherein other courts had 
22 In Mena, officers were searching for weapons in the re~idence of a wanted gang 
member, and the officers were outnumbered at a 2:1 ratio. Mena, 544 U.S. at 100. 
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approved of Terry frisks of detainees at search warrant executions, based on the theory 
that there was reasonable basis to believe that those detainees were armed and 
dangerous). Certainly Idaho is one such jurisdiction. In State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643 
(Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals applied the Terry standard to a situation in which, 
while police were executing a warrant at a residence, an individual approached that 
residence and was detained pursuant to Summers, supra. Id. at 459-61. The Court of 
Appeals held that the subsequent frisk of that individual was constitutionally permissible 
because, under the facts of that case (it was late at night; the individual supplied a 
dubious explanation for why he was present; officers were investigating a suspected 
guns-for-drugs operation; and the individual was wearing a "fanny pack" which could 
have concealed a weapon), it was reasonable to believe that the individual was armed 
and dangerous, and engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 461. 
In light of this standard, the first question in this case is whether, when Detectives 
Pelfreyman and Cain detained Mr. Russo, there was evidence to support a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that he was armed and presently dangerous. Mr. Russo submits 
that there was no such evidence. It was nearly noon, so lighting would not have been a 
concern; Mr. Russo was alone and, therefore, outnumbered by the officers; Mr. Russo 
was wearing jeans and a shirt (R., p.142) and, therefore, would have had little 
opportunity to conceal a weapon; and Mr. Russo was already in handcuffs by the time 
he was searched (see R., p.142), so even if he had a weapon, it would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to access and use effectively. Moreover, the district court 
specifically found that "[t]he officers had not observed the defendant to do anything 
illegal. The officers did not see the defendant with any weapon. And the officers did not 
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see the defendant act in a threatening manner." (1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.2.) 
The only fact which could have raised any security concern for the officers at all was 
that J.W.'s rapist used a knife to gain her compliance; however, the officers would have 
had no reason to suspect that (even assuming they had the right suspect in their midst) 
Mr. Russo still had the knife on him, hours after the rape, as he checked his mail. In 
short, there was no reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Russo was armed and 
dangerous when he was detained by the police and, therefore, the search of his person 
was impermissible under Terry and Kester. 
Even if the pat-down frisk of Mr. Russo's person was somehow permissible 
though, the fact is that once his cell phone was identified as such-and certainly once it 
was removed from Mr. Russo's reach-it was not subject to further search. First, a 
phone is not a weapon, so once the item in Mr. Russo's pocket was identified as a 
phone, the officers had no right to invade Mr. Russo's privacy further by seizing it or 
searching its contents. State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730 (Ct. App. 2005) ("After 
satisfying themselves that the item was a container and not a weapon, however, the 
officers had no valid reason to further invade Faith's right to be free of police intrusion 
absent reasonable cause to arrest him. . . . We conclude that the officers' removal of 
the Altoids tin from Faith's person was beyond the permissible limits of Terry and was a 
violation of Faith's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search."). 
Second, even if the cell phone itself is considered to be a weapon, the data 
stored on a cell phone is not, under any circumstances, a weapon. Accordingly, an 
officer would never be within his rights to peruse the contents of a cell phone as part of 
a protective frisk. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 ("The sole justification of the search in the 
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present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must 
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, 
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer."). 
Third, to the extent that a cell phone or its contents could somehow be construed 
as posing a threat to the detaining officers, as soon as that phone was taken out of 
Mr. Russo's reach, it ceased to be a threat and, therefore, could not be searched 
further. See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31 (holding that even if officers were concerned 
that an Altoids tin might contain a weapon, once that tin was removed from the 
handcuffed suspect's reach, it could no longer be construed as posing a threat and, 
therefore, "[t]he opening of the box and inspection of its contents was unlawful"). In 
other words, as soon as the risk attendant to the item in question abates, so too does 
the justification for the search of that item. See id.; cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
343 (2011) (making it clear that in a search incident to arrest, officers may search the 
arrestee's vehicle for officer safety reasons only to the extent that the vehicle, and any 
weapons that may be contained therein, are reasonably within the arrestee's reach). 
In light of the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that the removal of the cell phone 
from Mr. Russo's pants pocket, and the subsequent search of the data stored on that 
cell phone, cannot be justified under the Terry frisk exception to the warrant 
requirement. Accordingly, the State failed to establish that a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement applies in this case and it is apparent that Mr. Russo's rights 
were violated. 
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3. Because Mr. Russo Was Not Arrested Until After His Phone Was 
Searched (And His Arrest Was Based, At Least In Part, On The Evidence 
Discovered On His Phone), The Search Of His Person And His Phone 
Cannot Be Justified Under The "Search Incident To Arrest" Exception To 
The Warrant Requirement 
For the first time on appeal, the State has argued that the search of Mr. Russo's 
person, and the cell phone found on his person, was justified under the "search incident 
to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) 
Preliminarily, it is important to note that, especially in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment (because it is the State that bears the burden of proving that a given 
warrantless search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,290 (1995)), the State is notfree to raise 
new arguments for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 
509, 515 n.4 (2010) (identifying the rule that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider 
issues not raised in the court below," and suggesting that that rule generally applies to 
the State when it is the respondent on appeal, just as it does to the defendant-
appellant); State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 81-82 (2000) (rejecting the State's attempt to 
argue for the first time on a appeal that the defendant lacked "standing" to challenge the 
search of his wife's purse); State v. Reimer, 127 Idaho 214,218-19 (1995) (rejecting the 
State's attempt to argue for the first time on appeal that the search of a mug was 
permissible under the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement). See also 
Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56,57 (2006) ("Appellate court review is 
'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented ... below.' 
Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time 
on appeal.") (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Jones, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
954 (2012) (rejecting the government's attempt to argue for the first time in the Supreme 
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Court that placing a tracking device on a vehicle was lawful because the officers 
possessed probable cause to believe that the defendant was "a leader in a large-scale 
cocaine distribution conspiracy"; finding that because this argument was not addressed 
below and, therefore, not addressed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, it was 
forfeited). 
To the extent, however, that this Court is willing to indulge the State's new 
argument, it should reject it. The State's argument is essentially as follows: (1) 
although the police had absolutely no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest (as 
they repeatedly described their detention of him as an "investigative detention," explicitly 
told him that he was not under arrest, and explained that they searched him as part of a 
weapons frisk), this Court should retrospectively characterize the encounter as an arrest 
and a search incident to arrest; (2) in characterizing this encounter as an arrest and a 
search incident to arrest, this Court should ignore the fact that Mr. Russo was arrested 
primarily because of the fruits of the supposed "search incident to arrest," not based on 
the evidence which caused the officers to seek a search warrant for Mr. Russo's 
residence and motorcycle; (3) this Court should find that, if there is probable cause for 
issuance of a search warrant for a home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest 
the resident of that home; and (4) because Mr. Russo has not challenged on appeal the 
magistrate's issuance of a search warrant, it is now "undisputed" that probable cause to 
search and, therefore, to arrest, existed. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) This entire argument is 
premised on the assertion that the United States Supreme Court has held that a search 
incident to arrest may "precede[ ] a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a 
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suspect exists at the time of the search." (Resp. Br., p.11 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 
448 U.S. 98,111 (1980)). 
The flaws in the State's argument are legion. First and foremost, the State's 
argument is premised upon a somewhat misleading representation of United States 
Supreme Court precedent. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court certainly held 
that a search incident to arrest may precede formal arrest where probable cause to 
arrest exists at the time of the search, Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111; however, the State 
fails to mention that this is true only U[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the 
heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person," id., and where the fruits of that 
search do not serve as "part of' the justification for the arrest, Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 
541, 543 (1990) (quoting Sib ron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968)); see also 
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111 n.6. See State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351 (Ct. App. 
2008) ("So long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and the 
fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest, the 
search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that arrest."). 
In this case, the officers had no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest 
initially; they only intended to detain him. It was only because the phone was 
discovered and searched, and potentially incriminating evidence was found on that 
phone, that Mr. Russo was actually arrested. Detective Cain, one of the two officers 
who detained Mr. Russo, described the incident in her report as follows: 
Cpl. Weekes stated that if he stepped outside if his residence again, he 
needed to be detained ... , Mike exited his residence . . .. I detained 
Mike with my handcuffs and told him he was being detained. He asked if 
he was being arrested ofr] detained. I told him it was called an 
investigatory detention at this time. I then searched Mike to make sure he 
didn't have anything sharp on him. He had a wallet in his right back 
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pocket and a cell phone in his front right pocket. . .. I held onto Mike's 
wallet and cell phone until I turned them over to Detective King when he 
arrived on scene approximately 5 minutes after I detained him. 
(R., p.142 (emphasis added).) Detective King then searched the phone. (See 
R., p.104; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.21 - p.71, L.2.) The report of Detective Palfreyman is 
consistent with that of Detective Cain: 
Det. Cain advised me that she had been given the instructions that if the 
suspect, Russo, came out of the residence again . . . that we were to 
detain him for questioning . .... 
At approximately 1150 hours Det. Cain advised me that she saw the 
suspect leave the residence and head towards the mailboxes .... 
Det. Cain and I then made contact with Russo at the mailbox area. He 
was detained and placed into handcuffs. Det. Cain then searched him for 
any weapons. We did not locate any weapons on him.23 
(R., p.139 (emphasis added». 
Further, a subsequent affidavit submitted in support of a request for a warrant 
authorizing a search of the phone, which by then had already been searched by Det. 
King, described the incident as follows: 
[A] cellular phone was recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat 
down search for officer safety. This phone was opened and looked at to 
determine ownership. Your affiant knows that a video was located on that 
phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's rape. At that 
point the review of the cell phone's contents was stopped .... Your affiant 
requests permission to search the entirety of the phone. 
(R., p.154.) Thus, Mr. Russo's arrest would not have followed on the heels of the 
search of his person, but for discovery of the video found on the phone found on his 
23 Det. Palfreyman's report makes no mention of the phone found in Det. Cain's search 
of Mr. Russo's person, or Det. King's search of that phone a few minutes later. 
(R., pp.139-40.) 
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person?4 Accordingly, rather than presenting an argument that is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, the State seeks to have this Court turn that precedent on its 
head. 
A second flaw in the State's position is that it has not, and indeed cannot, support 
its contention that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for a 
home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. However, 
it simply cannot be said that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant 
for a home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. See 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979) (holding that a search warrant authorizing a 
search of a tavern and the person of the bartender did not establish probable cause to 
search another patron found on the premises); United States v. Oi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 
585-86 (1948) (holding that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile 
exception does not allow for searches of the individuals riding therein). Indeed, the 
inquiry of whether probable cause exists to conduct a search is not identical to the 
inquiry of whether probable cause exists to arrest. See State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 
282 (Ct. App. 2005).25 If it were, and if probable cause to search necessarily gave rise 
24 The district court noted that the search could not be justified as a search incident to 
arrest because the subsequent arrest "was, in part, based on the items obtained at the 
search." (1/27/10 Tr., p.82, LsA-6.) 
25 In Gibson, the Court of Appeals explained as follows: 
The standard of probable cause involves the same quantum of 
evidence regardless of whether an arrest or a search is involved. United 
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004). Nonetheless, the 
facts needed to justify a search are different from those needed to justify a 
seizure. Humphries, 372 F.3d at 659. Rather, each conclusion requires a 
showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances. 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (3d ed.1996). The right to 
arrest arises when a crime is committed or attempted in the officer's 
presence whereas a search can be authorized when probable cause 
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to probable cause to arrest the homeowner (and search that homeowner incident to 
arrest), in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court would not have had to engage in 
an analysis of whether the homeowner could be temporarily detained while the police 
executed a search warrant at his residence; it simply could have held that, because a 
magistrate had determined that there was probable cause to believe drugs were in 
Summers' home, ipso facto, there was probable cause to arrest him and search him 
incident to arrest. But, of course, that was not the holding of Summers; Summers was 
far more limited. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05 ("If the evidence that a citizen's 
residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an 
invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that 
citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. 
Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband 
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."); see also Bailey v. 
United States, _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (reaffirming Summers, but declining 
to expand it to allow for detentions of suspects not in the immediate vicinity of the 
residence to be searched). And, in Summers, the Court noted that Summers was 
arrested (and searched incident to arrest), only after his home had been searched 
demonstrates that an item connected with criminal activity will be found in 
a certain location. Id. In the case of an arrest, the conclusion concerns the 
guilt of the arrestee. LaFave, supra, at § 3.1 (b). Accordingly, although the 
conclusions that justify a search or seizure must be supported by the 
same degree of integrity, the conclusions themselves are not identical. Id. 
Therefore, the existence of probable cause to search Gibson's vehicle 
does not resolve whether there was probable cause to believe that Gibson 
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance. 
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282. 
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pursuant to a properly-executed search warrant and that search yielded additional 
evidence to support a finding of probable cause to arrest Summers. See id. at 693 & 
n.1. 
The third flaw in the State's reasoning relates to the question of whether, given 
the facts of this case, there was actually probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. The State 
claims that "it is undisputed in this case that the officers had, before they detained and 
searched him, established probable cause to believe that Russo had committed several 
rapes." (Resp. Br., p.11 (emphasis added).) As such, the State suggests that 
Mr. Russo has implicitly conceded that there was probable cause to believe he 
committed one or more rapes. The State's assertion, however, is misleading, and its 
suggestion is false. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo did not challenge the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause to search his residence and, therefore, its issuance of the search 
warrant. However, this decision on Mr. Russo's part is in no way a concession that 
probable cause-either to search or to arrest-existed. A forfeiture of a claim is far 
different than a concession of that claim. Thus, the fact that Mr. Russo has not 
challenged the issuance of the search warrant in no way informs the question of 
whether there was probable cause to arrest him.26 A more accurate assertion from the 
26 There are any number of reasons why an appellate claim may be forfeited, see, e.g., 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983) (recognizing that appellate counsel may, 
for strategiC reasons, properly forgo colorable claims on appeal), not the least of which 
is that a given claim may be subject to an unfavorable standard of review. Compare 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact 
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo 
review. A magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference 
by reviewing courts.' 'A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants,' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches 
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State would have been that, when Mr. Russo filed his original Appellant's Brief, it had 
not yet been disputed on appeal that the officers had probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Russo was a rapist. And, of course, the reason that this issue had not yet been 
disputed on appeal is that the State's "search incident to arrest" argument was raised 
for the first time on appeal. Mr. Russo simply had no reason to argue that probable 
cause was lacking prior to then. Accordingly, the State's suggestion that this appeal 
can be resolved by reliance on a single fact-the fact that a warrant was issued for a 
search of Mr. Russo's residence-should be rejected. 
Turning then to the facts of this case, it is apparent that there was no probable 
cause to support an arrest prior to discovery of the cell phone video. When police got 
the call about J.W.'s rape, they immediately suspected Mr. Russo-not because they 
had any evidence linking him to the crime, but because he was their usual suspect. 
(See R, pp.131-32.) Mr. Russo has a Washington conviction for rape (the rape 
occurred in 1995). (R, pp.129-30.) In addition, he was a suspect in a bizarre home 
invasion in Nampa in August 2008. (See R, pp.127-29.) He was not charged in that 
case though. (R, p.78; see a/so R, pp.123-32.) Thereafter, based on his prior 
conviction and the suspicion that he was involved in the Nampa home invasion, 
conducted pursuant to a warrant 'courts should not invalidate ... warrant[s] by 
interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.' ... 
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of 
an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as the 
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.") (Citations omitted), 
and State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2004) (applying Gates' "substantial basis" 
standard in reviewing the district court's decision to issue a search warrant), with 
State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-53 (1989) (reviewing de novo the trial court's 
determination that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant). 
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Mr. Russo was identified as a suspect in a July 2009 rape in Fruitland.27 (See R, 
pp.125-27.) However, he had not been charged in that case either. (R, pp.78-79; see 
also R, pp.123-32.) The fact is that there was no direct evidence actually linking 
Mr. Russo to either the Nampa incident or the Fruitland rape. (See R, pp.125-31.) 
Furthermore, the victim of the Nampa incident was shown at least three photo lineups 
and one video lineup which included Mr. Russo, but she never identified him as her 
attacker (R, p.78), and bystanders who saw the apparent assailant leaving the scene of 
the Nampa incident indicated that Mr. Russo was not the man they saw (R, pp.78, 
128). 
The only new evidence that the police had when J.W. reported her rape in this 
case was that, when the police went to the home of their 'usual suspect in the early 
morning hours of August 29, 2009, the engine of his motorcycle was "extremely hot," 
indicating that it had recently been ridden, and the lights were on in Mr. Russo's 
residence, indicating that Mr. Russo was awake early that morning.28 (R, pp.131-32.) 
27 While the Fruitland rape bore a couple of similarities (as well as a large number of 
dissimilarities) to the rape Mr. Russo committed in Washington in 1995, the Nampa 
incident bore no similarities. (R., pp.128-32.) 
28 In its Respondent's Brief, the State suggested that the police had an additional piece 
of evidence connecting Mr. Russo to the rape of J.W. It asserted that "[s]tarting around 
6:00 [on the morning of J.W.'s rape] officers saw Russo making several trips to a 
laundry room near his four-plex apartment where he started doing laundry, including 
clothing matching the description provided by the victim of clothing worn by the rapist." 
(Resp. Br., p.5; see also Resp. Br., p.13.) This suggestion was exceptionally 
misleading. The record reveals only that, before they obtained a warrant to search 
Mr. Russo's residence, officers saw him leave that residence and walk around his 
building. There is no indication that the officers knew he was going to/from a laundry 
room, and there is certainly no indication that the officers saw him carrying clothes fitting 
the description provided by J.W. (See R, pp.145, 153-54. (application for amended 
search warrant, indicating that it was only later that officers learned of the existence of 
the laundry room, and seeking permission an amended warrant that would allow a 
search of that laundry room). 
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Mr. Russo submits that merely being the usual suspect, and having apparently been out 
and about on the morning after the rape-with no evidence actually connecting him to 
J.W., her residence (or even her city),29 or the crime-does not constitute probable 
cause to arrest.30 See Mary/and v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (discussing the 
probable cause standard). A hunch? Definitely. Reasonable articulable suspicion? 
Perhaps. But probable cause? Most certainly not.31 
4. Because The "Inevitable Discovery" Doctrine Has No Application In This 
Case, The Exclusionary Rule Applies And The District Court Erred In 
Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video 
"The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and 
bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to an illegal search." State v. 
Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,915 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,496 
(2001)). While there are some exceptions to the general rule requiring the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence, the State bears the burden of pleading or proving these 
exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444-45 & n.5 (1984). 
One exception to the exclusionary rule is the so-called "inevitable discovery" 
doctrine. See id. at 441-48. In order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the 
State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the information at issue 
29 The rape was committed in Nampa, but Mr. Russo lived in Meridian. 
30 Had the evidence concerning the other alleged crimes been sufficient to give rise to 
probable cause, presumably Mr. Russo would have been arrested and charged for 
those crimes. 
31 Mr. Russo's contention that probable cause to arrest did not exist prior to discovery of 
the cell phone video is supported by the State's candid concession below that, without 
the video, it probably could not even take Mr. Russo's case to trial. (R., p.121.) 
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would have independently been discovered through lawful means. Bunting, 142 Idaho 
at 915. 
In applying the inevitable discovery doctrine and determining whether the 
evidence at issue would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means 
independent of the illegal search, the reviewing court is not permitted to assume the 
hypothetical of what would have been discovered had the officer acted lawfully. Rather, 
there must be a showing that some other independent action was already taking place, 
or had taken place, that would have revealed the same evidence. Id. at 916-917. The 
Bunting Court made this abundantly clear: 
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a 
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took 
place, or was in the process of taking place, would have led to the 
discovery of the evidence that was already obtained through unlawful 
police action. The inevitable discovery doctrine was not intended to allow 
a court to consider what actions the authorities should· or could have taken 
and in doing so then determine that lawful discovery of the already 
unlawfully obtained evidence would have been inevitable. 
Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In fact, 
more than 25 years ago, the Court of Appeals put it more bluntly: "The [inevitable 
discovery] doctrine 'is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by 
substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.'" State v. 
Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Judge Burnett's concurring 
opinion in State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984)). Thus, recently, in 
State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163,170 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals declined to 
apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule just because an 
investigation may have reached the same result absent the Fourth Amendment 
violation. The Liechty Court observed as follows: 
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[T]he issue before us whether an additional line of investigation would 
have revealed the [contraband], not whether the evidence would have 
been discovered had the encounter between the officer and Liechty not 
occurred while the officer was standing in the open passenger doorway 
[the Fourth Amendment violation]. Indeed, we decline to predict how such 
a conversation would have unfolded. The record does not disclose any 
additional line of investigation and, as a result, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine does not apply. 
Liechty, 152 Idaho at 170. 
In this case, the inevitable discovery doctrine has no application. The State's 
argument below was that, even had the detectives not (impermissibly) searched 
Mr. Russo's phone when they did, once they realized that he had a phone on his 
person, they would have obtained a new search warrant (such as the amended warrant 
that was actually issued in this case) authorizing a search of that phone.32 (See 1/27/10 
Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6; R, p.119.) This, however, would not have been an independent line of 
investigation; it would have simply been a continuation of the already-existing line of 
investigation, which does not satisfy the standards of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
See Liechty, 267 P.3d at 1285; Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917; Holman, 109 Idaho at 
392. Furthermore, simply asserting that, had the officers not searched the phone 
illegally they would have obtained a warrant to search that phone is doing nothing more 
32 Insofar as the State attempts to argue that the contents of the phone would have 
inevitably been discovered because of issuance of the actual amended search warrant 
in this case, that argument would be absurd because the State used the fruits of its 
illegal search of that phone to obtain the amended warrant. (R., p.154 (stating in the 
affidavit in support of the request for an amended warrant that "a cellular phone was 
recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat down search for officer safety. This 
phone was opened and looked at to determine ownership .. Your affiant knows that a 
video was located on that phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's 
rape. . .. Your affiant requests permission to search the entirety of the phone).) Not 
only does this not satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine's requirement of an 
independent line of investigation, but it also violates the basic principle that a search 
that is unlawful at its inception cannot be validated by what it turns up. Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963). 
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substituting what the police should have done for what they really did. Again, this fails 
to satisfy the standards of inevitable discovery doctrine. Holman, 109 Idaho at 392. 
Likewise, the district court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was in 
error, albeit for a different reason. This district court concluded that it was inevitable 
that the cell phone video would have been discovered because, even though the 
original search warrant had not arrived yet, that warrant had been issued and it 
authorized a search for phones, which implicitly authorized a forensic search of those 
phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81! L.22 - p.83, L.23.) Thus, the district court appears to have 
assumed that, had the original search warrant been present on-scene, it would have 
authorized a search of Mr. Russo's person and the cell phone kept on his person. (See 
1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) However, this reason is flawed since, for the 
reasons set forth in Parts 1(8) & II(C)(1), supra, a search warrant authorizing a search of 
a residence does not extend to the person of someone detained outside the residence. 
On appeal, the State again argued the inevitable discovery doctrine, but it did so 
based on a wholly new theory. This time, the State placed no reliance on the search 
warrants; instead, it argued that, even if the original search of Mr. Russo and his phone 
was improper, because it was inevitable that he would have been arrested at some 
point, it is likewise inevitable that his phone would have been seized and searched. 
(Resp. 8r., pp.12-13.) However, the reality is that the police did not have probable 
cause to arrest Mr. Russo when they first arrived, and they did not discover sufficient 
new evidence to give rise to probable cause to arrest him after they searched his home 
and motorcycle. As noted above, all police knew when they arrived at Mr. Russo's 
residence was that he was their usual suspect, and that he had been out and about on 
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his motorcycle early that morning.33 Furthermore, when they executed their warrants, 
they found only two items of interest-neither of which is particularly probative. First, 
the officers found in the laundry room clothing supposedly matching that which was 
worn by J.W.'s assailant.34 However, the clothing found was far from a perfect match to 
that which was described by J.W. Immediately after she was raped, J.W. called 9-1-1 
and reported that her attacker had been wearing jean shorts (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.281, L.23 
- p.282, L.1; Ex.1), but the clothes found in Mr. Russo's laundry room included full-
length jeans, not jean shorts (8/3/10 Tr., p.387, Ls.1-13).35 Second, although the police 
33 The State claimed that the evidence showed that "Russo had driven his motorcycle a 
considerable distance before 5:47 a.m. the morning of the rape" (Resp. Br., p.13); 
however, this was fanciful speculation by the State. The evidence showed simply that 
the motorcycle's engine was "extremely hot." (R., p.132.) There is no evidence in 
record showing how hot "extremely hot" is, and there is certainly no expert testimony in 
the record equating any particular motorcycle engine temperature with any particular 
distance driven. 
34 Officers also found in Mr. Russo's residence a pair of boots which, at trial, it 
attempted to link to a tread print left on J.W.'s balcony. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.371, L.20 -
p.372, L.12; Ex. 30.) However, despite what the officers may now claim, the possible 
match of Mr. Russo's boots to the marks on the balcony would not have been 
immediately apparent and, thus, Mr. Russo's boots would not have necessarily 
implicated him. Indeed, even after thorough study, the State's expert was never able to 
link Mr. Russo's specific boots to the marks on the balcony. (8/3/10 Tr., p.470, L.19 -
p.480, L.10.) In fact, she conceded that the boots found in Mr. Russo's residence are 
common, as they are available at the Gowen Field Base Exchange, and a lot soldiers 
deploying out of Gowen Field are wearing them. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.474, L.20 - p.475, 
L.11.) In addition, the type of outsole in question, the "Sierra" produced by Vibram, is 
not only available on boots like those possessed by Mr. Russo and common among 
Idaho's soldiers, but is also used on numerous other brands of shoes or boots, 
including: Wolverine, Belleville, Rocky Shoes, Weinbrenner, Danner, Bule, Brown, 
McRae, Wellco, Altama, STC, Jengrate, Minor, and Son. (8/3/10 Tr., p.475, L.12 -
~.476, L.14.) 
5 The evidence discussed in this portion of Mr. Russo's Reply Brief was not before the 
district court when the suppression motion was decided. However, because the State 
never argued inevitable discovery based on an inevitable search incident to arrest 
below and Mr. Russo, therefore, was deprived of an opportunity below to show why that 
argument fails, fundamental fairness, i.e., due process, as guaranteed by the 
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found latex gloves in the saddlebags on Mr. Russo's motorcycle (R., p.135)-latex 
gloves which the State now claims were "similar to those used by the rapist" (Resp. Br., 
p.13)-the fact is that the State has offered no evidence to suggest that those latex 
gloves fit any sort of specific description provided by J.W. (See Ex. 1 (9-1-1 call 
indicating that the rapist used "medical" gloves, but failing to otherwise describe them)). 
Mr. Russo contends that clothing different from that which was described by the victim, 
and latex gloves that were not shown to be similar to those used in the rape, were not 
probative of his guilt and, therefore, even when coupled with the officers' hunch (arising 
out of the fact that Mr. Russo was their usual suspect and had obviously driven his 
motorcycle early that morning), did not give them probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. 
See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71. 
Further, even if this Court could, in hindsight, say that probable cause existed, 
that does not mean that Mr. Russo would have inevitably been arrested at that time?6 
The fact is that the officers at the scene may not have subjectively believed probable 
cause existed such that they could arrest Mr. Russo. Indeed, as noted above, the State 
has voiced its belief that, without the video, it does not have a case against Mr. Russo. 
(See R., p.121.) Thus, without that video, the officers might not have had sufficient 
confidence in their case to arrest Mr. Russo. They may very well have wanted to await 
forensic testing of the evidence accumulated to that point (e.g., DNA testing of the latex 
gloves, expert analysis of the boot treads, or review of the cell phones and other 
Fourteenth Amendment, demands that he be allowed to go outside the evidence that 
was before the district court at the suppression hearing. 
36 Because the State raised this argument for the first time on appeal, it missed its 
opportunity to introduce evidence that the officers, in fact, would have arrested 
Mr. Russo even without the cell phone video. 
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electronic found within the residence), or they may have wanted to try to obtain an 
identification of Mr. Russo by J.W., before arresting Mr. Russo. Indeed, it appears that 
the authorities had been reasonably cautious with Mr. Russo before. Although he was a 
suspect in certain other cases (and the evidence against Mr. Russo in those cases was 
the same evidence that was used to obtain the search warrant in this case (see R., 
pp.123-32)), there is no evidence that he had ever actually been arrested in any of 
those cases prior to the suppression proceedings in this case. 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Russo submits that the State has failed to prove that 
an exception to the exclusionary rule applies and, therefore, the district court erred in 
failing to suppress the evidence obtained in the illegal search of Mr. Russo's phone. 
III. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly Prejudicial 
Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual Interests 
A. Introduction 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, evidence of a defendant's bad character or 
bad acts may not admitted to show that the he is a person who acted in conformance 
with his bad character. Evidence of the defendant's bad acts may be admitted for other 
purposes though, such as to prove motive, intent, or plan. 
In this case, the district court allowed the State to present evidence that 
Mr. Russo has had sexual fantasies involving rape, and that he possessed pornography 
depicting simulated rape, ostensibly to show that the Mr. Russo had the motive, intent, 
and plan to rape J.W. However, because the rape fantasy and rape pornography 
evidence does not evidence any motive, intent, or plan on Mr. Russo's part to rape J.W. 
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and because, even if it did, its probative value was so substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect, the district court erred in allowing the State to present this evidence to 
the jury. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, generally speaking, evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that the person acted in conformity therewith." I.R.E. 404(b). However, such 
evidence may be admitted "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... " 
Id. 
Under I.R.E. 404(b), there is a two-tiered analysis for determining the 
admissibility of "prior bad act" evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The 
court must first "determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other 
crime or wrong as fact" and "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, 
would be relevant ... to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, 
other than propensity." Id. If the evidence is insufficient to establish the other crime or 
wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if proven, is not relevant to an issue 
other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends. See id. 
However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, and that crime 
or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then "engage in a balancing 
under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Id. 
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Turning to the question of the applicable standard of review, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that the district court's determination that the evidence in question is 
relevant to some issue besides the defendant's bad character is reviewed de novo, but 
the district court's balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the unfair 
prejudice to the defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 141 
Idaho 148, 150 (Ct. App. 2004) . 
C. The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly 
Prejudicial Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual 
Interests 
As noted, prior to Mr. Russo's trial , the State sought leave to offer extensive 
evidence of Mr. Russo's other crimes, wrongs, or acts, including evidence that he has 
had sexual fantasies about rape and has possessed pornography depicting simulated 
rape. The State argued that the fantasy and pornography evidence was relevant to a 
non-character/non-propensity issue-Mr. Russo's motive, intent, or plan-and, 
therefore, was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (R. , pp.45, 59-60, 88, 187-227, 228-35, 
237; 3/18/10 Tr. , p.8, L.14 - p.19, L.11 ; 5/1 1/10 Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4, L.19, p.5, L.20-
p.6, L.17, p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.3.) The district court agreed , and it ruled the rape fantasy 
and rape pornography evidence admissible. (See R. , pp.175-76, 243; 3/18/10 Tr. , p.67, 
L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77, L.25 - p.78, L.10; 4/22/10 Tr. , p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.13; 5/11/10 
Tr., p.18, L.7 - p.25, L.22, p.29, L.23 - p.31 , L.23.) 
Mr. Russo contends that the district court's ruling was in error, as it was based on 
a faulty application of the Grist standard. Specifically, Mr. Russo asserts that the rape 
fantasy and rape pornography evidence is not relevant to any proper purpose and, even 
50 
if it is marginally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice. 
1. The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case Was 
Relevant Only To Mr. Russo's Character 
Taken together, evidence of Mr. Russo's sexual fantasies involving rape and his 
possession of pornography depicting simulated rape tend to show only that Mr. Russo is 
sexually aroused by the thought and/or depiction of rape. It is not probative of whether 
he was the one who actually raped J.W. on August 27, 2009; nor is it probative of any 
actual plan or intent to rape J.W. Indeed, the only way that this evidence can be 
characterized as showing Mr. Russo's intent or plan to rape is to assume that because 
Mr. Russo has a predilection for rape, he must have planned or intended to act in 
conformity with that predilection; however, this is precisely the type of baseless 
generalization that Rule 404 is intended to guard against. That Rule makes it clear that, 
just because someone has done a certain act, shown a certain propensity, or exhibited 
a certain character trait in the past, one cannot assume that he acted accordingly on the 
date in question. See I.R.E. 404. Indeed, in this case, the prosecution never 
attempted-either in arguing its motions in limine, or in arguing its case to the jury at 
trial-to connect Mr. Russo's predilection for rape to any particular plan or scheme to 
rape J.W.37 
The only (proper) issue that Mr. Russo's predilection for rape could possibly be 
relevant to would be motive. The theory, perhaps, would be that, given Mr. Russo's 
37 Certainly, the State did raise the inference that J.W.'s rape was a carefully planned 
crime. And the evidence supports this inference. But the State never attempted to 
explain how Mr. Russo's rape fetish connected to any particular plan. 
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predilections, he raped J.W. to satisfy his sexual desires; under this argument, sexual 
gratification would be the motive. However, such an argument would make little sense 
in a case such as this one. Quite obviously, anyone who breaks into a young woman's 
apartment, clearly for the sole purpose of raping her, does so for the purpose of sating 
his sexual urges. Thus, motive is simply not at issue in this case. Cf State v. Roach, 
109 Idaho 973, 974-75 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that even in the case of a specific intent 
crime, such as lewd conduct with a minor, because "the intent needed to convict can be 
manifested by the circumstances attending the act," the defendant's intent may not be 
sufficiently at issue in the case to warrant introduction of "other crimes" evidence aimed 
at proving intent). Moreover, even if the motive of sexual gratification were somehow 
relevant to this case, this motive has in no way been shown to be specific to J.W. 
Accordingly, even if Mr. Russo had a motive to rape generally, this motive in no way 
connects him particularly to the rape of J.W. 
2. Even If The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case 
Was Relevant To Such Proper Topics As Motive, Intent, Or Plan, It Was 
Nonetheless Inadmissible Because Its Probative Value Was Substantially 
Outweighed By The Risk Of Unfair Prejudice To Mr. Russo 
Assuming arguendo that there is some relevance to the evidence demonstrating 
Mr. Russo's predilection for rape, the probative value of any such evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to that evidence. 
Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred in finding it admissible under Rule 
404(b). 
Initially, as noted in Part III(C)(1), supra, it is Mr. Russo's contention that 
evidence of his rape fantasies and his possession of pornography depicting simulated 
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rape is wholly irrelevant to anything other than character or propensity; in particular, he 
contends that it is not relevant to motive, intent, or plan. However, even if this Court 
determines that such evidence is relevant to an issue such as motive, intent, or plan, 
Mr. Russo contends that it is only marginally relevant (for same reasons, set forth 
above, that he contends that it is not relevant at all). 
More importantly, Mr. Russo contends that this evidence is extraordinarily 
prejudicial. As noted, it demonstrates a predilection for rape which, in the average 
juror's mind, would likely be viewed as an extremely deviant and disturbing preference. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that, traditionally, there has been 
an "unstated belief that sexual deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful 
probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior," State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
569-70 (2007) (quoting D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 13.9 (1995», so any 
such evidence would tend to have a significant impact on the jury's verdict. Thus, in 
recent years, the Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized that evidence of extreme 
sexual deviancy is simply too prejudicial to the defendant to be put before the jury 
where its probative value is marginal. See, e.g., State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,466 
(Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]here was a high risk that the jury would convict Pokorney based 
upon propensity and sexual deviancy. We are constrained to conclude that the unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence."); State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669-70 (2010) (finding that the error in admitting prior 
instances of the defendant's sexual misconduct with children was not harmless because 
"[e]vidence of prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is 
a reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction"). As this is just 
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such a case, it is apparent that the district court erred in concluding that the probative 
value of the rape fantasy and rape pornography evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and, therefore, the district court erred in 
admitting that evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court grant 
review of all issues. Assuming it does so, Mr. Russo further requests that it reverse the 
district court orders denying suppression of the cell phone video and admitting evidence 
of his sexual fantasies and pornography; that it vacate his convictions and sentences; 
and that it remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 13th day of May, 2013. 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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